Race and ethnic variation in norms of filial responsibility among older persons. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 61 3 , — Caro, F. Family and aging policy. Hoboken: Taylor and Francis. Chappell, N.
Filial responsibility: Does it matter for care-giving behaviours? Cheng, S. Childlessness and subjective well-being in Chinese widowed persons. Journals of Gerontology. Filial piety and psychological well-being in well older Chinese.
The Gerontologist, 53 6 , — Dimensionality of burden in Alzheimer caregivers: Confirmatory factor analysis and correlates of the Zarit Burden interview. International Psychogeriatriatrics, 26 9 , 1—9. Successful aging: Asian perspectives. Donorfio, L. Relationship dynamics between aging mothers and caregiving daughters: Filial expectations and responsibilities. Journal of Adult Development, 8 1 , 39— Funk, L.
Associations between filial responsibility and caregiver well-Being: Are there differences by cultural group? Research on Aging, 35 1 , 78— Ganong, L. Changing families, changing responsibilities family obligations following divorce and remarriage.
Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Test your vocabulary with our fun image quizzes. Image credits. Word of the Day goodwill. Blog Outsets and onsets! Read More. November 08, To top. Examples of filial obligation. Definition of filial Definition of obligation Other collocations with obligation. Sign up for free and get access to exclusive content:. Free word lists and quizzes from Cambridge.
Tools to create your own word lists and quizzes. Word lists shared by our community of dictionary fans. Sign up now or Log in. Your current browser may not support copying via this button. Sign In Article Navigation. Subscriber sign in You could not be signed in, please check and try again. Username Please enter your Username. Password Please enter your Password. Forgot password? Don't have an account? Sign in via your Institution. Analogously, a child owes more to a parent who sacrificed a great deal than she would owe to a parent whose sacrifice was less substantial.
Keller finds this an unacceptable consequence of Gratitude Theory. Keller also objects that filial obligations, unlike obligations of gratitude, are ongoing and open-ended, and if filial obligations were grounded in gratitude, we would have no gesture that would capture that gratitude.
Sending a card or flowers seems laughably insufficient as a demonstration of gratitude. However, she argues that the theory does not offer any action-guiding principles and so cannot answer the question it seeks to answer: what do I owe my parents?
This is not simply the claim that the theory does not specify the content of filial obligations, but rather it does not even tell us what sort of action is required. Gratitude Theory might require no action at all but only a certain emotional experience, namely the experience of being grateful to the benefactor.
If the theory offers a range of possible expressions of gratitude, we will still require some guidance as to the appropriate range of actions; that is, we still need to know whether something like a thank-you or flowers would be appropriate, or whether something like paying for expensive medical care is required. If Gratitude Theory requires a particular emotional attitude, then it must answer well-known problems associated with requiring emotional experiences.
It has three conditions:. If 1 a parent needs some special good, 2 the parent has provided or currently provides special goods to the child, and 3 the child is able to provide the special good that the parent needs, then the child ought to provide that special good to the parent. In contrast to the previous theories, Special Goods Theory of filial obligations focuses on the benefits to the child and the needs of the parent.
Specifically, this theory states that the parent-child relationship is one that makes possible certain special goods. Generic goods, on the other hand, are those that can easily arise from other sources. In making his case for Special Goods Theory, Keller states six intuitions about filial obligations and argues that his theory best explains those intuitions.
He states them as follows:. Keller concludes from these intuitions that the parent-child relationship and, consequently, filial obligations, are unique. Unlike Debt theory and Friendship theory, Keller begins with the assumption that the parent-child relationship is not analogous to any other kind of relationship. The intuitions are worth discussing further, as Keller often appeals to them as justification for his theory of filial obligation.
First, Special Goods Theory can explain why filial obligations cannot be fulfilled once and for all. Satisfying the three conditions has no theoretical limit; consequently, the obligation can be ongoing. Fulfilling obligations in a particular instance does not preclude the continuous satisfaction of the conditions. Any time these conditions are satisfied, filial obligations arise, and the conditions can remain satisfied for as long as the parent is alive. Second, Special Goods Theory explains why one does not have less extensive or fewer filial obligations for having been easy to raise.
Provided that a parent requires some special good and has in the past provided special goods to his or her children, and that the children enjoy reciprocal relationships with their parent, then any differences between what the children owe will result from differences in their abilities to provide for the parent. Third, Special Goods Theory explains why we cannot easily escape filial obligations. Whether the conditions for filial obligations are satisfied is, to a large extent, out of our control.
Further, we cannot escape filial obligation simply by terminating the relationship. Doing so will not effect whether the conditions for filial obligations are satisfied. Consider a case in which a mother has terminated her relationship with her child. For example, if the mother does not wish to speak to her child, then her child is no longer positioned to provide the good in question; that is, staying in touch with her mother. The child, however, may still have other filial obligations. Yet, these may also depend on the current nature of the relationship, for it can shape the content of the obligations.
The third condition of filial obligations is that one is uniquely positioned to provide certain goods. The theory does not include the further requirement that one positions oneself in order to provide such goods. Finally, Special Goods Theory can explain why filial obligations can be demanding.
The child has an obligation to provide expensive long-term care for the parent if the child can provide it and if the parent has provided special goods to the child in the past or at present. According to the conditions of this theory, the extent of the obligation depends on the extent of the need and the extent to which the child can provide the required special goods. This theory can potentially generate a wide range of filial obligations, from virtually costless to oppressively demanding, for the three conditions could continue to be satisfied so long as the parent and child are alive.
Nothing about discharging the obligation in a particular instance precludes the conditions from being satisfied again, thereby generating new obligations. Moreover, in societies that do not provide care for their ageing members, long-term care is a special good, for it is unlikely to be provided by a source outside of the relationship.
Importantly, though, this theory clearly tells us what our filial obligations are: we ought to provide our parents with the special goods they need, provided they have provided those goods to us in the past. Keller says that we owe our parents special goods in the context of reciprocity. According to Welch, there are three plausible interpretations of this restriction but none suffice to avoid his moral objection.
The first interpretation is that parent-child relationships are, when things go well, reciprocal insofar as both the parent and child benefit from the relationship. At least, the child benefits during his early years and the parent in her later years.
The current state of the relationship does not necessarily determine whether the relationship is reciprocal. The second interpretation is that a reciprocal relationship might require ongoing reciprocity; that is, the parent and child enjoy a reciprocal relationship so long as each continues to benefit. This interpretation suggests, however, that filial obligations no longer exist once the parent cannot contribute to the relationship.
Welch argues that this is problematic by offering the following example: in a society in which care for elderly persons is the responsibility of private citizens, an elderly woman suffering from dementia requires medical care, and she has a wealthy daughter who can provide such care.
Yet, because the mother is physically and mentally incapable of contributing goods to the relationship, the relationship is no longer reciprocal. The daughter is wondering whether she has an obligation to provide such care for her mother, since her mother needs the care, has provided care in the past, and the daughter can provide the care.
Either the parent-child relationship is reciprocal so long as it is now or was mutually beneficial, or it is reciprocal only when the mutual benefits are ongoing. Here, filial obligations are theoretically unlimited, regardless of the current state of the relationship. In the latter case, filial obligations diminish or disappear if the parent is no longer able to provide special goods to the child, even if this inability is not by choice.
Here, filial obligations are unreasonably limited because children have obligations to their parents only so long as the children continue to benefit. One could say that the parent-child relationship is reciprocal so long as:.
If parents fail to play their part—though perhaps not by choice—the relationship is no longer reciprocal. According to Welch, what is missing from the theory is a clear account of what changes in a relationship effect what filial obligations a child has and why. A mother who suffers from dementia does not deserve less because it renders her unable to contribute to the relationship, whereas a father who has unreasonably disowned his son arguably deserves less as a result of his choice to exit the relationship.
Gratitude for Special Goods Theory, however, avoids both of these problems. On Gratitude for Special Goods Theory, in order to avoid filial obligations, the children must be both unable to meet current needs and to position themselves to meet those needs without undermining the mutual respect necessary for moral relationships.
Furthermore, Welch argues that her theory of filial obligations is superior to Special Goods Theory because it responds appropriately to considerations of what the parent deserves. The difference, Welch argues, is that gratitude requires that both parties respect one another and themselves, and the provision of special goods is an appropriate expression of that respect. Thus, if the parent has provided special goods in the past but either done so with the expectation of repayment or has at some point come to treat the child as merely a means to an end, the child has no obligations of gratitude since gratitude might undermine rather than support relationships of mutual respect.
The child might experience gratitude, but that gratitude is not required and might even be inappropriate. According to Welch, this theory has several advantages over its predecessors. Second, it specifies what we ought to do for our parents. Specifically, any changes that undermine mutual respect would diminish or eliminate filial obligations; any changes that restore mutual respect would generate or strengthen filial obligations.
Finally, it responds to the demands of justice and offers a moral argument for gender equality in care provisions for ageing parents. Theories focusing only on the goods themselves cannot explain what is wrong with the striking gender imbalance in the provision of these goods. Gratitude for Special Goods Theory can do just that, according to Welch. She argues that a son who either shifts the responsibility of parental care to his sister or wife has already failed to discharge his filial obligations.
It does not simply matter that the goods are provided but also who provides them.
0コメント